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The last decade has witnessed rapid expansion of Islamic financial instruments, 
notably with the proliferation of Islamic investment certificates called Sukuk. Sukuk 
generally represent the Islamic financial instrument equivalent to conventional bonds. 
We  evaluate  the economic differences between these financing techniques and 
appraise the implications on the future expansion of Sukuk. We use a market-based 
approach to investigate whether investors react differently to the announcements of 
issues of Sukuk and conventional bonds. We find that the stock market is neutral to 
the announcement of conventional bonds, but we observe a significant negative stock 
market reaction to the announcement of Sukuk. We explain this different stock market 
reaction  using  the adverse selection mechanism,  which favors Sukuk  issuance  by 
lower-quality debtor companies. Unlike arguments presented in prior literature, our 
results support the view that differences exist between Sukuk and conventional bonds 
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I. Introduction 
The last decade has witnessed an unprecedented rapid expansion in  Islamic 
finance. Recent figures indicate that the total assets of Islamic banks operating in over 
75 countries worldwide  are  about 300 billion USD with an annual growth rate 
exceeding 15% (Chong and Liu, 2009). However, this expansion is also fuelled by the 
impressive increase in the issuance of Sukuk, often referred to as Islamic bonds. Just 
like Islamic banks provide an alternative mode of financing compared to conventional 
banking, Sukuk are Islamic investment certificates similar to conventional bonds in 
that they allow sovereign and corporate entities to raise funds in capital markets but 
following the principles of Shari’a, which is the Islamic legal code. 
The  global outstanding volume of Sukuk  exceeds 90 billion USD with an 
increase in the volume issued from 7.2 billion USD in 2004 to 39 billion USD in 2007 
(Jobst et al., 2008). Islamic financial instruments largely originate in the Far East 
(Malaysia  and  Indonesia) and in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. 
Nevertheless, they are also issued  outside these regions with the Saxony-Anhalt 
German State Sukuk in 2004 and the US GE Capital more recently in 2009. What is 
even more striking is the fact that several European governments (including France 
and the United Kingdom) are taking legal steps to favor the issuance of Sukuk in their 
countries. The motivations for this development in countries outside the Muslim 
world  might be numerous,  but  they notably highlight  the willingness of Western 
governments  to attract funds from the  GCC countries to finance sovereign and 
corporate debt. 
The new and rising global interest in Sukuk raises several questions. To which 
extent do Sukuk differ from conventional bonds? Are Sukuk an alternative way of 
financing that may gradually replace conventional bonds? What are the economic - 3 - 
 
implications of the expansion of Sukuk? To answer these timely research questions, 
we investigate the stock market reaction to the issuance of Sukuk and conventional 
bonds by corporate entities. By doing so, we provide a comparative analysis of Sukuk 
and conventional bonds that  is only based on the market’s  perception  of these 
alternative financing instruments.  Our  approach  appraises  Sukuk  from  two  novel 
perspectives. 
First, we inform on the opinion of stock markets regarding differences between 
Sukuk  and conventional bonds. Are  Sukuk  different from conventional debt 
instruments?  There is currently  a debate on  whether  Sukuk  really differ from 
conventional bonds. Miller, Challoner, and Atta (2007) and Wilson (2008) argue that 
Sukuk returns are structured to replicate conventional bond characteristics, but others 
like Cakir and Raei (2007) take an opposite stand to show that Sukuk are different 
from bonds because they present diversification benefits in terms of risk reduction 
when added to a portfolio of fixed income securities. Our analysis uses market-based 
evidence to address this unresolved issue. 
Second, a market perception analysis rests on investors’ valuation of Sukuk and 
provides insights into their future prospects. Are Sukuk likely to replace conventional 
bonds? While the issuance of Sukuk is mainly motivated by religious principles, it is 
also spurred by financial reasons (e.g. the access to a new class of investors). In this 
light, a better (worse) valuation of Sukuk in comparison to conventional bonds would 
be in favor of an optimistic (pessimistic) view of the expansion of Sukuk markets. 
Our study is important because it touches upon the economic implications of the 
recent expansion of Sukuk both at the firm and systemic levels.  Indeed, a better 
valuation of Sukuk relative to conventional bonds indicates that their increasing use 
contributes to creating firm value, whereas a worse valuation suggests  that Sukuk - 4 - 
 
expansion may contribute to destroying firm value. Another economic implication 
concerns the systemic stability and long-run viability of Islamic banking. All banks 
(conventional or Islamic) have incentives to hold a portfolio of investment assets, 
because they are more liquid than loans and they yield a higher return than interbank 
loans. However, the liquidity needs of Islamic banks are accentuated by the lack of 
acceptable  means  to  deal with the asset liability mismatch  inherent in  banking 
operations. Islamic banks cannot borrow in the interbank market or at the central 
bank’s discount window because such transactions involve the payment of interest. As 
Wilson (2004) argues, the vast majority of Sukuk is held by Islamic banks because 
these financial instruments represent the backbone for the development of a much 
needed secondary Islamic capital market. If market participants view Sukuk  as 
different financing instruments compared to conventional bonds, then it is likely that 
the financial stability of Islamic banks, as Sukuk investors, might also be affected, 
either positively or negatively.  
The paper broadens the body of research on the scarcely investigated securities 
that are known as Sukuk. Existing work on the recent development of Sukuk appears 
in the context of books that describe the basics of Islamic finance (e.g. Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 2007; Visser, 2009), and very few studies focus on their evolution or their 
specific characteristics (e.g. Jobst, 2007; Jobst et al., 2008). 
To analyze the stock market reaction to Sukuk and conventional bond issuance, 
we use the event study methodology that allows for the measurement of the impact of 
a corporate event on the company’s stock return. Specifically, we examine whether 
announcements of Sukuk and conventional bond issues lead to significant abnormal 
returns for the issuers. In this aim, we consider a sample of Malaysian listed 
companies which issued conventional bonds and Sukuk from 2002 to 2009. Malaysia - 5 - 
 
represents the most interesting fieldwork to address our research questions because it 
is by far the most dynamic country for the issuance of Sukuk. In 2007, the volume of 
issued Sukuk in Malaysia was 28.1 USD billion compared with 19 USD billion in 
GCC countries (Ernst & Young, 2009). We do not consider GCC Sukuk because the 
majority of issues are sovereign, and there is no active secondary market for them 
because most are usually held till maturity. In contrast, Malaysia dominates the global 
corporate  Sukuk  market with 75%  share  of  total  corporate  Sukuk  over  the period 
January 2004-June 2007. Furthermore, Sukuk represent about half of the total stock of 
Malaysian corporate bonds (Jobst et al., 2008), implying that Sukuk are not limited to 
a small portion of the disintermediated financing for companies. Therefore, Malaysia 
represents the most interesting country to address our research questions. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we overview 
Sukuk developments, challenges, and related literature. In Section III, we present our 
empirical design with a description of the data used and the presentation of results, 
which we discuss in Section IV. We conclude in Section V. 
 
II. Overview of Sukuk 
In this section, we start by defining Sukuk, distinguishing them from 
conventional investments such as bonds and stocks, followed by a description of 
recent market developments. We then review the prospects and challenges faced by 
Sukuk. We conclude by addressing our main research question regarding whether 
Sukuk are expected to be different from conventional bonds. 
  
II.1 What are Sukuk? - 6 - 
 
  The Islamic capital market has taken a head start since the turn of the century 
with the development of Shari’a-compliant financial instruments known as Sukuk.
1
In May 2003, the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI) officially defined Sukuk in the Standard for Investment Sukuk 
as certificates of equal value representing undivided shares in ownership of tangible 
 
Sukuk  investments represent a distinct class of securities issued by sovereign and 
corporate entities. They are investment certificates with bond- and stock-like features, 
which are issued  to finance trade or the production of tangible assets. Similar to 
bonds, Sukuk certificates have a maturity date, and holders are entitled to a regular 
stream of income over the life of the Sukuk in addition to another balloon payment at 
maturity. However, Sukuk are asset-based (rather than asset-backed) securities, with 
the underlying being Shari’a-compliant in its nature and use. The eligibility of Sukuk 
rests on identifying an existing or a well-defined asset, service,  or project that is 
capable of being certified by a third party, and for which ownership can be recorded 
in some form. Sukuk holders might be responsible for asset-related expenses, and the 
sale of Sukuk results in the sale of a share of an asset. Bonds, in contrast, are pure debt 
obligations issued to finance any activity and whose value rests on the 
creditworthiness of the issuer,  whereas  Sukuk  prices vary both with the 
creditworthiness of the issuer and the market value of the underlying asset. Further, 
Sukuk and shares of stock are similar financial instruments in the sense that they 
represent ownership claims and that the return on both investments is not guaranteed, 
but  Sukuk  are related to a specific asset, service or project for a period of time, 
whereas equity shares represent ownership claims on the whole company with no 
maturity date. 
                                                 
1 The term Sukuk is a plural form of the Arabic term Sakk that can be translated as “to strike one’s seal 
on a document” (McMillen, 2007) and which, according to Adam (2006), worked its way in Medieval 
Europe to become the modern day Latin word of “Cheque”. - 7 - 
 
assets, usufruct and services, and it identified at least fourteen possible Sukuk 
structures. The AAOIFI Standard distinguishes Sukuk from stocks, bonds, and from 
the conventional process of securitization as well, emphasizing that Sukuk are not debt 
certificates with a financial claim to cash flow and that they may not be issued on a 
pool of receivables. Rather, they are similar to a trust certificate with proportional or 
undivided interest in an asset or a pool of assets, and the right to a proportionate share 
of cash flow is derived from ownership interest that carries risks and benefits.  
Sukuk structures vary from Murabaha (cost-plus sales), Salam (pre-payment 
of an asset for future delivery), Ijara (rental/ lease agreement), Istisna (build-to-own 
property), Mudaraba and Musharaka (partnerships).
2
  In a typical Ijara  Sukuk  structure, the originator sells assets to the Sukuk 
issuer, which is a bankruptcy-remote special purpose vehicle (SPV) that is created to 
act as a trustee for investors acquiring the assets (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007).
 However, most offerings to-date 
are  Ijara-based, with some recent innovations taking place in the structuring and 
pricing of Musharaka Sukuk (Abdel-Khaleq and Richardson, 2007; Wilson, 2008). 
Appendix 1 and 2 present  diagrams  to illustrate Ijara  and  Musharaka  Sukuk 
structures, respectively. 
3 The 
assets are leased back to the Sukuk issuer for a stated period, with the agreement to 
sell the asset back to the lessee at the end of the lease period.
4
                                                 
2 Murabaha, Salam, and Istisna Sukuk certificates are not readily tradable on the secondary market due 
to Shari’a restrictions (Usmani, 2002).  
 At the same time, the 
3 Shari’a scholars agree that ownership of an asset is possible with proper documentation even if the 
title is not registered under the buyer's name. The common practice is to transfer the beneficial title but 
not the legal title of ownership to avoid transfer taxes or other unfavorable costs. One exception is the 
case of Qatar global sukuk whereby an actual transfer of the land title took place to the SPV. 
4 It should be noted that there are Shari’a restrictions to executing a contract of sale of the leased assets 
at a future date at the time of initiating the Ijara agreement. The sale/ purchase deal is not an integral 
part of the Ijara agreement, and can only be executed at the time of transferring back the assets from 
the lessor to the lessee. Alternatively, an initial sale/ purchase undertaking can be entered into, allowing 
the lessee to ultimately purchase back the assets. Such an undertaking is not a contract, and is only 
binding on the undertaker while the other party has the option not to proceed. Further, it is only signed 
after completing the initial sale agreement relating to the assets. - 8 - 
 
SPV issues certificates of participation to investors representing undivided ownership 
in the underlying asset. Over the term of the lease contract, the trustee receives rental 
payments for the use of the asset and distributes them to certificate holders in 
proportion to their ownership stake.
5
  Alternatively, in a Musharaka Sukuk structure, the two parties include an 
originator providing a pool of assets and an SPV which raises cash by selling Sukuk 
notes to investors (Abdulkader and Nathif, 2004). These parties enter into a 
Musharaka (partnership) arrangement for a fixed period and agree on profit- and loss-
sharing ratios. The issuer also undertakes to buy the Musharaka shares of the SPV on 
a periodic basis. The two partners then appoint a managing agent (usually the 
originator) to act on behalf of the Musharaka, and to develop or make efficient use of 
the asset(s). In return, the agent gets a fixed agency fee and a variable incentive fee 
payable. The cash returns generated from the Musharaka are paid as profits to the 
Sukuk investors. At the end of the fixed Musharaka period, the issuer would have 
bought back the Musharaka shares at pre-agreed prices and intervals, and the SPV no 
longer has any shares in the partnership. Partnership contracts through Musharaka 
Sukuk  strengthen the paradigm of Islamic finance and are preferred from the 
viewpoint of jurists because they rest on profit-and-loss arrangements. The returns on 
  At the expiry  of the lease contract, Sukuk 
holders’ ownership claims cease to exist and payments flow stop. They receive the 
return on their principal and asset ownership reverts to the lessee. If the asset has a 
market value, Sukuk  holders can realize a capital gain  or loss. However, if the 
underlying is a public good for which there is no market, Sukuk holder exercise an 
embedded put option whereby the originator buys back the underlying assets at face 
value.  
                                                 
5 Most Ijara Sukuk pay a predetermined rate of return to investors. Variable rate Sukuk linked to an 
agreed upon pricing benchmark, usually the LIBOR, may also issued under a Master Lease Agreement. - 9 - 
 
such participation certificates are contingent on the company fundamentals and not 
benchmarked to market rates. They are also attractive to investors because they are 
negotiable instruments that can be traded in the presence of an active secondary 
market. 
 
II.2 Sukuk developments 
Sukuk were issued as early as the 1980s, but their growth was significantly 
marked after the turn of the century. According to Moody’s (2007, 2008), the global 
outstanding volume of Sukuk exceeds US$90 billion and is expected to reach $200 
billion by 2010, with issuance quadrupling from $7.2 billion in 2004 to close to $39 
billion by the end of 2007, and up from $336 million only in 2000. Table 1 shows the 
distribution of Sukuk  across corporate and sovereign issues over the period 2000-
2006. 
Figures in Table 1 indicate that corporate Sukuk dominate total issuance with a 
market share that reached a peak exceeding 94% in 2005. Corporate Sukuk broaden 
the firm’s financing base away from traditional sources of fund (such as bank loans 
and lines of credit that are saved for other strategic investments), and extend their 
maturity beyond the short term horizon usually granted by banks. Further, corporate 
Sukuk issues increase public recognition of the company and raise its profile in the 
market. 
Malaysia dominates the Sukuk market with a share standing at approximately 
70% of total issues, despite some mega-deals in the past two years that have 
established Dubai International Financial Exchange (DIFX)’s position as another 
global leader in Sukuk, with a total of eight listings worth exceeding $10 billion as of - 10 - 
 
June 2007 (DIFC, 2007).
6, 7 The Malaysian law plays a significant role in developing 
the market for Sukuk because it has a special provision for non-profit making trusts, 
similar to English law (Wilson, 2008). Such a legal framework facilitates the 
establishment of SPV that is required for all Sukuk to hold the title of the underlying 
securitized assets and administer payments to investors.
8 In this background, Sukuk 
issuance proliferated in Malaysia and a secondary market that is much more active 
compared to the GCC region developed.
9
On the international level, London is keen on maintaining a lead in the 
provision of Islamic financial services, and it signaled its intention to stimulate the 
industry through the Finance Bill 2007 (
 In our study, we only include Sukuk from 
Bursa Malaysia to address our research question. Figures 1 and 2 show the strong 
expansion of Sukuk in Malaysia during the last decade. 
Miller, Challoner, and Atta, 2007)
More recently in late 2009, two new issues have marked the recognition and 
acceptance of Sukuk beyond the borders of the Islamic world (Parker, 2010b). First, 
the 5-year Aaa-rated $100m Sukuk by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
jointly  lead arranged by HSBC, Dubai Islamic Bank and Kuwait Finance House-
. The 
objective of this new legislation is to place  Sukuk  on a level playing field with 
conventional securitization by providing them with a tax treatment equivalent to other 
financial products. 
                                                 
6 Some of the mega-Sukuk of the GCC include the 2004 Department of Civil Aviation of  UAE issue 
for $750 million to fund the expansion of the Dubai International Airport, the 2006 Sukuk by Dubai 
Ports, Customs and Free Zone Corporation for $3.5 billion, the 2006 Abu Dhabi Aabar Petroleum oil 
exploration and production fully convertible Sukuk for $460 million, the 2006 Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 
$800 million floating rate Islamic note which secured ratings from Fitch Ratings and Moody’s, and the 
2006 Nakheel Group record of $3.52bn unrated Sukuk with unique IPO rights.  
7 As of December 2009, Bursa Malaysia took the lead again in terms of total Sukuk value which 
exceeds $17.6 billion for 12 issues, followed by DIFX ($15.7 billion), London (GBP 6.5 billion), 
Luxembourg ($7.3 billion), and Bahrain ($2.18 billion and BD330 million) (Parker, 2010a). 
8 According to Wilson (2008), lead Sukuk managers include Citigroup. HSBC, Standard Chartered, and 
Deutsche Bank. 
9 Wilson (2008) suggests that Malaysian Sukuk might serve as a tool for Islamic banks to manage 
liquidity problems, as an alternative to going to London Metal Exchange to buy/ sell commodities on a 
Murabaha basis. - 11 - 
 
Bahrain, was well oversubscribed, with the proceeds intended to increase funding for 
development activities in emerging markets, including the MENA region. Although 
the size of the issue is not large compared to other mega-Sukuk, it shows that leading 
international institutions like the World Bank recognize the importance of Sukuk as a 
financing tool. Second, GE Capital in the US also closed a 5-Year $500 million Sukuk 
issuance whose proceeds will be used for general corporate and balance sheet 
purposes. This transaction is strategically important for GE because it raises funds 
from a new and important investor base. 
 
II.3 Sukuk prospects and challenges 
Sukuk  serve  as an important instrument  for resource mobilization and a 
primary vehicle for the development of Islamic capital markets. Solé (2008) argues 
that expanding the range of financing opportunities for the private sector in Kuwait 
(and other similar emerging economies engaged in large infrastructure projects) by 
developing  Sukuk  and bond markets is likely to deepen the financial sector and 
diversify the economy away from oil activities. Jobst et al. (2008) summarize the 
economic, financial, legal, and regulatory challenges for the Sukuk market. They also 
suggest that, despite the global financial crisis, there is a strong demand from both 
Muslim countries and conventional global institutions for Shari’a-compliant securities 
in the form of Sukuk. 
Abdel-Khaleq and Richardson (2007) evaluate the legal challenges for issuing 
Sukuk  in non-Islamic jurisdictions and argue that Sukuk  avail a new area of 
cooperation between various international stakeholders. The authors present the first 
American Sukuk offering backed by US oil and gas assets, and issued by The East 
Cameron Gas Company. The deal involves parties from the US, a bankruptcy-remote - 12 - 
 
intermediary issuer of certificates in the Cayman Islands, investors from the Muslim 
and Western worlds, bankers in London and Beirut, and legal counsels from Dubai 
and Houston. The transaction is deemed Shari’a-compliant because it essentially 
involves the sale of property, and it ties investor returns to a profit distribution scheme 
which also depends on the performance of the underlying.  More importantly, the 
Sukuk originator was able to tap liquid resources from the Muslim world to support 
drilling and operation wells in the Gulf of Mexico for a Texas-based company, thus 
providing an alternative and innovative form of corporate financing that complements 
traditional sources of funding. 
Wilson (2008) addresses the criticisms to Ijara Sukuk related to linking 
distributions to the LIBOR. He examines innovations in the structuring of Sukuk 
securities and the potential for novel structures based on Musharaka or a hybrid of 
different Sukuk structures. Wilson also proposes adopting alternative benchmarks to 
the LIBOR based on macroeconomic indicators of real activity such as GDP growth 
for sovereign Sukuk and of firm performance in the case of financing corporations. 
 In Islamic finance, conventional financial derivatives are not Shari’a 
permissible investments because they are regarded as being unreal instruments, or 
'promises', as opposed to actual assets. Tariq and Dar (2007) assess the various risks 
associated  with  Sukuk  investing. They also discuss the possibility of developing 
Shari’a-compatible risk mitigating techniques such as embedding in Sukuk options 
and swap features to hedge against those risks. Convertible Sukuk are first issued in 
the Malaysian market in 2005, but they have not been widely launched in any market 
before until recently in Dubai.
10
                                                 
10 Examples include the $200 million International Investment Group (IIG) Sukuk exchangeable into 
shares of a Kuwaiti company, and the Malayan Banking Bhd subordinated Sukuk qualifying as Tier 2 
capital and which includes embedded options for the originator to redeem in whole (and not in part) the 
Sukuk.  
 - 13 - 
 
 However, these financial instruments can only achieve their benefits if they 
are issued and traded on a large scale. According to Moody's (2007, 2008), the major 
drawback is that Sukuk are usually held till maturity and an active secondary market 
has yet to develop. In the GCC region, there is almost no secondary trading in sukuk 
because most investors treat these instruments as "buy and hold" investments. 
McMillen (2007) argues that widespread issuance and trading can be achieved if 
Sukuk obtain ratings, which are currently absent in light of the inability to secure 
satisfactory legal opinions with respect to Shari’a enforceability issues in different 
jurisdictions. The impact of such legal impediments might be lessened under a 
standardization of Shari’a-compliant transactions that reduces transactional risks 
through consistency, predictability, and transparency in the enforcement of Shari’a, in 
addition to contributing to the integration of Islamic financial services in the global 
economy. 
Aside from legal enforceability issues, a recent debate was initiated regarding 
the Shari’a-compliance nature of Sukuk.
11
                                                 
11 The Sukuk debate was triggered after a scholar reportedly said that most current Sukuk structures are 
not Shari’a-compliant and appear to violate the principle of risk and profit sharing by promising to pay 
back principal (Norman, 2009).  
 After a series of meetings in 2007, the 
AAOIFI  Shari’a  council issued in February 2008 proposals for amendments in 
contemporary Sukuk issues including new recommendations regarding the ownership 
of underlying assets in a Sukuk  transaction and the guarantee of the principal 
investment to Sukuk  certificate holders. These AAOIFI efforts culminated in the 
publication of six core principles for structuring and issuing Sukuk in relation to asset 
ownership rights and obligations of Sukuk holders, the nontradability of Sukuk with 
underlying revenue streams or debt, the corporate responsibility of the Sukuk manager 
when actual earnings fall short of expected earnings, the lessee’s right to purchase 
leased assets when Sukuk are extinguished for their nominal value, the purchase of - 14 - 
 
Sukuk at net value instead of nominal value, and the on- going duty of the Shari’a 
Supervisory Board after initial Sukuk issuance (AAOIFI, 2008). 
 
II.4. Are Sukuk different from conventional bonds? 
The recent controversy on the compliance of Sukuk  with the precepts of 
Shari’a  signals that Sukuk  are generally structured along Western rules of asset 
securitization, and  raises the question of whether these innovative financial 
instruments are really different from conventional bonds. According to Miller, 
Challoner, and Atta (2007), Sukuk are structured in a way to ensure an equivalent 
return to a conventional bond, the difference being that the return on the Sukuk is 
generated from an underlying asset and not from the obligation to pay interest. 
Similarly, Wilson (2008) argues that financiers exercise special care to render Sukuk 
identical to other conventional securities because they aim at simplifying investors’ 
risk assessment of these new investments. As a result, Sukuk mirror conventional 
securities, suggesting that product innovation coupled with distinctive and pricing risk 
characteristics is lagging in the Islamic finance industry. 
 Shari’a scholars oppose rendering Islamic financial instruments familiar to 
international investors because of the danger of making them similar to conventional 
interest-based products, despite the argument that such similarity helps bridging the 
gap between conventional capital markets and the emerging Islamic securities market 
to further strengthen global financial integration. According to the President of the 
AAOIFI  Shari’a  Council, Mohammad Taqi Usmani, current practices of issuing 
Sukuk replicate the structure of conventional bonds in terms of lack of ownership, 
right to a fixed return, and the guarantee of repayment of principal. Usmani (2007) 
also argues against obtaining international ratings, since Sukuk can be rated by the - 15 - 
 
recently established regional ratings agency, if needed, and Islamic banks should 
stand ready to endorse the acceptability of Sukuk. 
 Alternatively, Cakir and Raei (2007) take an opposing stand on the suspected 
comparability of Sukuk and conventional bonds, suggesting that Sukuk are different 
financial instruments compared to conventional bonds. The authors examine the risk 
reduction advantages of issuing sovereign Sukuk as alternative financing instruments 
compared to sovereign conventional bonds. Using a sample of sovereign Sukuk and 
Eurobonds by the same issuer, the authors estimate and compare the value-at-risk 
(VaR) for a portfolio that includes both instruments to another portfolio that only 
comprises Eurobonds. They find that VaR is reduced when Sukuk are added to the 
portfolio of fixed-income securities, implying that these investment certificates offer 
diversification benefits for investors. 
  In our study, we examine whether Sukuk are really different from conventional 
bonds using a sample of actively traded Sukuk and bond instruments in Malaysia. 
 
III. Empirical design 
In this section, we first provide a description of the data and relevant 
descriptive statistics. Then, we present the methodology and the results. 
III.1 Data and summary statistics 
The sample of issues of Sukuk  and conventional bonds comes from 
Bloomberg. Our sample spans the years 2002 through 2009. The sample size is 
determined by information availability on all requested variables, notably the closing 
stock prices for companies issuing debt  for  a time span long enough before the 
announcement date of the issue, in order to apply the market model and compute - 16 - 
 
abnormal returns. Our final sample includes 170 issues from which 77 are sukuk and 
93 conventional bonds. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on our sample of securities classified by 
issue type, distinguishing between conventional bonds and Sukuk. We observe that, on 
average,  conventional bonds are considerably  larger  in size than  Sukuk, with 
respective means for the amount issued equal to 314 million and 96 million Malaysia 
Ringgit (approximatively 92 million USD and 28 million USD at the current 
exchange rate). The maturity is, on average, twice longer for conventional bonds than 
for Sukuk (six years and half versus three years and half, respectively).  The shorter 
maturity of Sukuk might suggest that these financial instruments are likely to pay 
lower total return in terms of both current yield and capital gains yield. However, the 
descriptive statistics show that the average coupon rate on Sukuk is higher than for 
conventional bonds (4.06 versus 3.79 percent), and that Islamic securities in Malaysia 
are issued at a deeper discount compared to conventional debt instruments (97.94 
versus 99.17 percent of par) thereby offering greater potential for capital appreciation. 
These preliminary observations are interesting in the sense that higher promised 
returns on Sukuk might associate with greater investment risk, notwithstanding shorter 
maturity for these securities. They also suggest that Sukuk issuers are keen on offering 
greater return incentives for investors to purchase their securities, who are unwilling 
to commit their funds for long periods of time. 
To shed more light on the nature and characteristics of different issuers of 
conventional bonds and Sukuk, we provide in Table 3 descriptive statistics by issuer 
of each security. We find that companies issuing Sukuk are smaller in size than those 
issuing conventional bonds, both  in terms of balance sheet assets  and market 
valuation. They are also more indebted and exposed to greater financial risk. Sukuk - 17 - 
 
issuers are less capitalized with an average equity-to-assets ratio lower than 20 
percent, which is twice as small as the 40 percent equity-to-assets ratio of 
conventional bonds issuers. Debt ratios are similarly higher than those of conventional 
bonds issuers. To illustrate, the long-term debt-to-assets ratio of companies issuing 
Sukuk is close to 30 percent, whereas the corresponding figure for firms borrowing in 
the conventional market is around 20 percent. Under normal economic conditions, 
greater financial risk is likely to translate into higher profitability levels. However, all 
profitability ratios listed in Table 3 indicate that they are worse for firms issuing 
Sukuk  compared to companies raising funds through conventional bonds. Indeed, 
operating margin and ROA are negative for companies issuing Sukuk,  suggesting 
greater operating risk on top of the higher financial risk. In a nutshell, these 
observations point to a better financial and operating position for companies issuing 
conventional bonds compared to those engaging in Sukuk. To some extent, we can 
explain why Sukuk have shorter maturity and lower amount than conventional bonds, 
since they are associated with lower-quality borrowers. Further, Sukuk issuers have 
issued in the past twice more investment certificates (6.63  average issues) than 
conventional bond issuers (3.10 average issues). This finding might be in line with the 
fact that Sukuk are smaller in size and have shorter maturity, thus leading to the need 
for more issues. 
 
III.2 Methodology and findings 
Following the literature, we use a standard market model to estimate abnormal 
returns around the event date for a security issue
12
                                                 
12 See, for instance, Lummer and McConnell, 1989; Preece and Mullineaux, 1996; and Gasbarro et al., 
2004. MacKinlay (1997) also provides an excellent survey on event studies methods. 
. Our sample period is 2002 until 
2009, and we consider 93 events for conventional bonds and 77 events for Sukuk.The - 18 - 
 
date of announcement is considered as day 0. We estimate the market model 
parameters over the period (-100,  -10). This filter reduces the sample size to 
companies that have at least 100 days of stock returns observations. Using larger 
estimation periods (150 trading days) as well as stopping the estimation period up to 
30 days before the event date does not affect our results. We define returns as [P(t)-
P(t-1)]/P(t-1), where P is the stock market daily price at closing. We use several 
Malaysian stock indices (FBM 100, FBMKLCI, FBMEMAS, FBMS), all giving 
similar findings.
13
We examine one-day [0,0], three-day  [−1,+1] and five-day [−2,+2] event 
windows and calculate average abnormal daily returns (non standardized and 
standardized). We obtain cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) by summing 
daily excess returns over the respective event windows. We use standard OLS 
regressions estimate the market model, with an average R² (not reported) close to 20% 
for all estimations.  
 In the tables below, we show the results pertaining to the stock 
index giving the largest R² for the market model regression (or FBMEMAS). 
We perform t-tests to investigate the statistical significance of CAARs and 
standardized CAARs
14
                                                 
13 FBM 100: FTSE Bursa Malaysia Top 100 Index is a capitalization weighted index that is comprised 
of the top 100 large and mid cap companies on the Bursa Malaysia Main Board by market 
capitalization. FBMKLCI: FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI Index comprises of the largest 30 companies 
by full market capitalization on Bursa Malaysia Main Board. FBMEMAS: FTSE Bursa Malaysia 
EMAS Index is a capitalization weighted index that is comprised of the large and mid cap constituents 
of the FTSE Bursa Malaysia 100 Index and the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Small Cap Index. FBMS: FTSE 
Bursa Malaysia EMAS Shariah index is a market capitalization weighted index that incorporates the 
large and mid cap stocks of the FTSE Bursa Malaysia 100 Index and the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Small 
Cap Index. 
. Then, to investigate if the stock market discriminates among 
the type of investment certificate event (Sukuk versus conventional bond issuance), 
we apply Student, Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis tests to the CAARs and standardized 
CAARs by type of debt. 
14 We standardize CAARs using the square root of the product of the number of days in the event 
window and the mean square error. - 19 - 
 
Table 4 displays CAARs and standardized CAARs by type of security issue (Sukuk 
versus conventional bonds). The percentage of positive CAARs appears in the fourth column, 
while the last two columns provide p-values for t-tests of CAARs significance. Across all 
event windows, we notice that all computed CAARs are positive for conventional bonds and 
negative for Sukuk, despite lack of significance over the [0,0] and [-1,1] windows of returns. 
However, we observe that Sukuk issues’ CAARs and standardized CAARs are negative 
and significantly different from 0 for the largest event window [-2,2].
15
Table 5 displays the results of Student, Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis tests for 
the difference of CAARs and standardized CAARs by type of issue (Sukuk versus 
conventional bonds). For the first two tests, the null hypothesis is that the difference 
of CAARs (respectively standardized CAARs) between Sukuk and conventional bond 
issues’ events is null. For the Kruskal-Wallis test, the null hypothesis is that the Sukuk 
and conventional bond issues’ events samples come from identical populations. 
CAAR and standardized CAAR variances are unequal according to Fisher tests, so we 
use the Satterthwaite method for the Student tests. Student approximation gives 
similar results to normal approximation for Wilcoxon tests. We display the normal 
approximation (Z-score) for this test.  
 Further, the 
percentage of positive Sukuk CAARs is generally lower than the corresponding ratio 
for conventional bonds, and it decreases as the event window widens, whereas the 
percentage of positive conventional bonds CAARs rises with larger event windows. 
We  note  that the Student and Wilcoxon tests allow rejecting the null 
hypotheses for standardized CAAR over the largest event window [-2,2] at the 10% 
confidence level, i.e. the difference between the CAARs of Sukuk and bonds is not 
zero. In other words, abnormal returns are different for Sukuk and conventional bond 
                                                 
15 We also use Patell (1976), Boehmer et al. (1999), and cross-sectional t-statistics and obtain similar 
findings. - 20 - 
 
issues or, stated differently, the market does not react in a similar manner to these two 
types of issues and is hence capable of discriminating them. This result reinforces our 
previous finding of a negative market reaction to Sukuk issues in Table 4. 
 
III.3 Robustness checks 
We perform several robustness checks of the results. A first sensitivity check 
relies on using two different (asymmetric) four days event windows, i.e. [-1,2] and [-
2,1]. Since financial markets in emerging economies are not expected to be efficient, 
we may expect the existence of a leakage of information that a certain type of 
securities will be issued. In this light, it is possible that abnormal returns can be 
realized prior to the announcement date. We display the results of tests similar to 
those conducted above for symmetric event windows in Tables 6 (for CAARs and 
standardized CAARs by type of security issue)  and 7 (for  the  results of Student, 
Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis tests for the difference of CAARs and standardized 
CAARs by type of issue, respectively). First, we find that stock market reaction is 
negative and significant for Sukuk over both asymmetric event windows. This result 
confirms the results reported over the [-2,2] event window in Table 4, but they are 
slightly weaker in significance. Second, we observe that the stock market reaction 
differs following the type of investment security issuance, similar to the finding over 
the largest event window in Table 5. Hence, investors perceive conventional bonds 
and Sukuk issues differently on the Malaysian stock market.  
A second robustness check relates to the estimation of the market model in 
computing  normal  returns  for each stock.  In our sample, companies which issue 
conventional bonds do not issue Sukuk, and those which issue Sukuk do not issue 
conventional bonds. Since our sample exhibits market segmentation, it may be - 21 - 
 
inappropriate to use the same market model for both types of companies
16. In this 
light, stock returns for companies issuing different types of securities may be sensitive 
to different stock market indices. To address  this issue,  we perform two separate 
regressions to compute normal returns for companies issuing each type of security. 
The first uses the FBMEMAS index as a proxy of market return for companies issuing 
conventional bonds, and the second employs the FBMS Islamic index as a proxy for 
market return for companies issuing Sukuk
17. The rest of the methodology is exactly 
the same as described in sub-section III.2
18. We display the results using different 
market models in Tables 8 (for CAARs and standardized CAARs by type of security 
issue) and 9 (for the results of Student, Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis tests for the 
difference of CAARs and standardized CAARs by type of issue,  respectively). 
Compared to our main results in Tables 4 and 5, we observe that changing the market 
model  specification does  not alter our main findings. We find that stock market 
reaction is negative and significant for Sukuk over the largest event window [-2,2]. 
We also note that, for this event window, the stock market reaction differs following 
the type of security issued, confirming that investors have a different perception of 
conventional bonds and Sukuk issues
19
These additional robustness checks confirm and therefore reinforce our 
previously  obtained results.  Overall, the Malaysian stock market is capable of 
. 
                                                 
16 The average betas for companies issuing conventional bonds and Sukuk are equal to 1.21 and 1.11, 
respectively, when employing the same market model with the FBMEMAS index to proxy for market 
return. Using a t-test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of betas equality.  
17 The R² for the market model regression using the FBMS index equals 15.46%, and it is slightly 
lower than for the market model with FBMEMAS index (18.47%). 
18 Another alternative is to apply the Asset Pricing Theory approach and estimate normal returns using 
a Fama-French type of multi-factor model. However, we do not follow this method for two main 
reasons. First, recent evidence shows that event study results are weakly sensitive to the type of 
specification used to compute returns and that simple models are more appropriate (Ahern, 2009). 
Second, the implementation of a multi-factor model requires using companies’ characteristics that are 
available only on a limited sample, thus reducing the scope of our investigations. 
19 We obtain similar findings when using two asymmetric event windows and two different market 
model specifications. - 22 - 
 
distinguishing Sukuk from conventional bond issues and that stock market reaction is 
negative when Sukuk are issued. 
 
IV. Discussion 
Our empirical results wind up with three major findings related to Sukuk and 
conventional bonds issues: the absence of significant stock-market reaction to 
conventional bond announcements, the negative reaction to Sukuk issues and, as a 
corollary, the significant difference in stock market reactions to Sukuk  and 
conventional bond issues. 
A noteworthy first finding is the absence of significant reaction of stock 
markets to conventional bond announcements. This is not at odds with former 
literature, which includes studies providing evidence that stock markets do not react to 
debt announcements including bond issuances (Eckbo, 1986; Mikkelson and Partch, 
1986), even if some of them also find support for a negative reaction (Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves, 1999). The reaction of stock markets to the issue of bonds is 
influenced by opposing influences. Debt issuance may send a credible signal about the 
quality of firms,  helping to solve the  adverse selection  problem that  results from 
information asymmetries between firm insiders and outsiders, and thus leading to a 
positive  stock market reaction (Ross, 1977). It might also reduce moral hazard 
behavior and agency costs resulting from conflicts of interest between shareholders 
and managers (Jensen, 1986). However, stock markets might react negatively to debt 
issue events because greater debt may contribute to increasing moral hazard behavior 
under two possible scenarios.  First, debt enhances the bankruptcy risk of the 
borrower,  (since  bankruptcy is associated with the failure to repay due debt 
commitments); and second,  debt increases the agency costs resulting from the - 23 - 
 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders  (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  
Against this background, we interpret the absence of significant reaction to 
conventional bond announcements in the Malaysian stock exchange as the result of 
these opposing effects, and in line with the findings of former studies. 
However, the main conclusion of our study is the significant difference in 
stock market reaction to Sukuk and conventional bond issues, following the negative 
reaction to Sukuk issues in comparison with insignificant reaction to conventional 
bond issues. 
We use the adverse selection argument to explain our finding. We propose that 
only the borrowers with the lowest return expectations have incentives to prefer 
Sukuk. The reason is the following: borrowers can choose between interest-based 
(conventional bonds) and profit-and-loss sharing (Sukuk) securities. If an entrepreneur 
expects a low profit, he prefers profit-and-loss sharing financing schemes to minimize 
his loss in the likely event of failure. If an entrepreneur expects a high profit, he 
prefers interest-based financing to maximize his gain in the likely event of success. So 
the worst borrowers will choose to issue Sukuk, and stock market participants expect 
this  outcome. Hence a Sukuk  issuance  is likely to send a negative signal  on the 
financial position of the issuing firm. 
Kuran (2004) provides a similar argument to explain why many Islamic banks 
do not supply more equity-like financing instruments in line with the profit-and-loss 
sharing principle (Musharaka  and  Mudaraba)  and  in comparison with  debt-based 
financing instruments. Since Islamic banks coexist with conventional banks in most 
countries, they  are likely to face adverse selection problems if they only propose 
equity-like financing instruments.  Borrowers with low expectations might  opt for - 24 - 
 
these instruments whereas those with high expectations will deal with conventional 
banks.
20
Our interpretation of the findings is supported empirically by differences in the 
characteristics of the issuers of the two categories of securities. Companies issuing 
Sukuk  are in worse financial and operating shape than those issuing conventional 
bonds. They are notably more leveraged and less profitable. Therefore, these weaker 
companies may have economic incentives to prefer issuing  a security based on a 
profit-and-loss sharing principle rather than a fixed-income instrument that imposes 
more financial burden. 
 
Our major conclusion regarding the negative market reaction to Sukuk issues 
in comparison with insignificant reaction to conventional bond issues has several 
implications. The first one concerns the fact that stock market investors are able to 
distinguish between sukuk and conventional bonds. This market-based evidence 
supports the view of Cakir and Raei (2007) that Sukuk are different from conventional 
bonds, and it is opposite to the arguments of Wilson (2008) and Miller, Challoner, and 
Atta (2007). Although Sukuk are similar in structure to conventional bonds (Usmani, 
2007), stock market participants perceive these instruments as being special and they 
accordingly react differently to their issuance. 
A second implication relates to the evolution of Sukuk and the predictions of 
strong growth of this market. There might be several motivations for firms to issue 
Sukuk, including religious factors. However, the fact that stock markets negatively 
perceive Sukuk seems to indicate that the use of these securities should not be favored 
                                                 
20 “By allowing entrepreneurs to choose between interest and profit and loss sharing, conventional 
banks create an adverse selection problem for the Islamic banks: entrepreneurs with below-average 
profit expectations prefer profit and loss sharing in order to minimize their losses in the likely event of 
failure, while those with above-average expectations prefer interest in order to maximize their gains in 
the likely event of success. The upshot is that the Islamic banks receive a disproportionately large share 
of the bad risks.” (Kuran, 2004, p.12) - 25 - 
 
for economic reasons. Sukuk financing may be detrimental to firm value, at least in 
the short run, thus limiting shareholders’ incentives  to  issue  these  investment 
certificates. 
The third implication  deals with the economic effects of the expansion of 
Sukuk on Islamic banks, which are pillar institutions in the Islamic finance industry. 
Shari’a-compliant financial institutions hold Sukuk on their balance sheet as liquidity 
management tools in the same way that conventional banks invest in fixed income 
securities. It is possible that the worse market perception registered for Sukuk issues 
than for conventional bond issues might lead to a worse perception of their holders. 
 
V. Conclusion 
This  paper  analyzes  the stock market reaction to announcements of 
conventional bonds and Sukuk. We use the event study methodology to a sample of 
Malaysian public companies. Our findings support the view that stock markets react 
differently to issuances of both securities. While there is no significant market 
reaction to conventional bond issues, we observe a significant negative stock market 
reaction to Sukuk  issues. Furthermore, the stock market reaction is significantly 
different between both types of issues. 
We attribute this different reaction of stock markets to the expectations of 
participants that an adverse selection mechanism encourages  worse companies to 
prefer Sukuk to conventional bonds. Companies with low profit expectations have 
incentives to finance their project through Sukuk as these instruments are based on 
profit-and-loss sharing schemes to allow them minimize their share in the loss, while 
companies with high profit expectations opt for conventional bonds as it means a 
fixed repayment schedule and thus the maximization of their upside potential. This - 26 - 
 
explanation is corroborated by the worse financial situation for companies issuing 
Sukuk than for those issuing conventional bonds. 
Our  findings are relevant  for  two  major  debates in Islamic finance. First, 
Islamic finance is subject to criticism because its empirical application exhibits great 
similarity with conventional finance. Ayub (2007) observes that a major criticism of 
Islamic finance rests on the lack of differences with incumbent modes of finance. We 
provide opposing evidence that that stock markets are able to distinguish between 
Sukuk and conventional bonds. Thus, market-based information supports the existence 
of differences between instruments  emerging  from Islamic finance and those 
associated with conventional finance. 
A second debate concerns the economic effects of the expansion of Islamic 
finance. Our results show that Sukuk  announcement leads to a negative market 
reaction, adversely affecting firm value, whereas the issuance of conventional bonds 
has a neutral impact on market capitalization. Therefore, the increasing use of Sukuk 
may be detrimental to the firm and eventually to economic development, at least in 
the short run. 
A pessimistic view on the latter finding is the fact that negative stock market 
reaction  may  limit the incentives for companies to issue  Sukuk  rather than 
conventional bonds. In other words, market mechanisms are likely to limit the 
expansion of Sukuk, even if religious motivations may counterbalance them. In 
parallel, an optimistic interpretation of the implication of our results on the future 
development of Sukuk relates to the adverse selection mechanism in place that results 
from the coexistence of Sukuk and conventional bonds on the Malaysian market. Such 
a process would not happen if only Sukuk are issued on the same exchange. Thus, the 
negative reaction to Sukuk issues may be reduced in a pure Islamic financial system. - 27 - 
 
Nonetheless, before arguing in favor of the large-scale adoption of Islamic finance, 
additional research  is needed to assess the long run implications of using  Sukuk 
financing to finance for development.- 28 - 
 
References 
AAOIFI (2008). Shari'a  Board resolutions on Sukuk, available at 
http://www.aaoifi.com/aaoifi_sb_sukuk_Feb2008_Eng.pdf 
Abdel-Khaleq, A., Richardson, C. (2007). “New horizons for Islamic securities: 
Emerging trends in Sukuk offerings”, Chicago Journal of International Law, 
7(2), 409-425. 
Abdulkader, T., Nathif, A., (2004). “Islamic Bonds: Your Guide to Structuring, 
Issuing and Investing in Sukuk.” Economy Institutional Investor. 
Ahern, K. (2009). “Sample Selection and Event Study Estimation.” Journal of 
Empirical Finance 16, 466-482. 
Adam, N. (2006). “The Evolution of Sukuk: Establishing Singapore as an Islamic 
Financial Hub.” Sukuk Masterclass, February 22-23. 
Ayub, M. (2007). Understanding Islamic Finance, Wiley. 
Boehmer, E., Musumeci, J. and Poulsen, A.B. (1991). “Event-Study Methodology 
under Conditions of Event-Induced Variance”. Journal of Financial Economics 
30, 253-272. 
Cakir, S., Raei, F. (2007). “Sukuk vs. Eurobonds: Is there a difference in value-at-
risk?” International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/07/237. 
Chong, B. S., Ming-Hua L., (2009). “Islamic Banking: Interest-Free or Interest-
Based?” Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 17, 125-144. 
Dubai International Financial Center (2007). “Sukuk Value Tops $10 Billion on DIFX 
With DIFC Investments Listing”. Press Room, June 18.  
Eckbo, B. (1986). “Valuation Effects of Corporate Debt Offerings”. Journal of 
Financial Economics 15, 119-151. 
Ernst and Young (2009). Ernst & Young Islamic Funds and Investments Report 2009. - 29 - 
 
Gasbarro,  D., Le, K., Schwebach, R. and Zumwalt, J., (2004). “Syndicated Loan 
Announcements and Borrower Value”. Journal of Financial Research, 27, 133-
141. 
Iqbal, Z., Mirakhor, A. (2007). An Introduction to Islamic Finance-  Theory and 
Practice. Wiley Finance Editions, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New 
Jersey. 
Jensen, M., (1986). “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers”, American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings 76, 323-
329. 
Jensen, M., Meckling, W. (1976). ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs, and Capital Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics 76, 323-339. 
Jobst, A. (2007). “The Economics of Islamic Finance and Securitization”. IMF 
Working Paper n°07/117, Washington. 
Jobst, A., Kunzel, P., Mills, P., Sy, A. (2008). “Islamic Bond Issuance-  What 
Sovereign Debt Managers Need to Know”. International Monetary Fund 
Working Paper PDP/08/3. 
Kuran, T. (2004). Islam and Mammon, Princeton University Press. 
Lummer, S. and McConnell, J., (1989). “Further Evidence on the Bank Lending 
Process and the Capital-Market Response to Bank Loan Agreements”. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 25, 99-122. 
MacKinlay, A.C., (1997). “Event Studies in Economics and Finance”. Journal of 
Economic Literature 35, 13-39. 
Mikkelson, W., Partch, M. (1986). “Valuation Effects of Security Offerings and the 
Issuance Process”. Journal of Financial Economics 15, 31-60. - 30 - 
 
Miller, N.D., Challoner, J., Atta, A. (2007). “UK Welcomes the Sukuk”.
Moody’s (2007). “Focus on the Middle East”. Inside Moody’s, (Winter). 
 International 
Financial Law Review, 26(5), 24-25. 
Moody’s (2008). “Focus on the Middle East”. Inside Moody’s, (Spring). 
Norman, T. (2009). “Sukuk, where next?” Global Arab Network, July 6, 2009. 
Parker, M. (2010a). “Bursa Malaysia tops in Sukuk listing”. Arab News, January 18, 
2010. 
Parker, M. (2010b). “Sukuk market proliferation in GCC”. Arab News, Monday 11 
January 2010. 
Preece, D. and Mullineaux, D.J., (1996). “Monitoring, Loan Renegotiability, and Firm 
Value: The Role of Lending Syndicates”. Journal of Banking & Finance, 20, 
577-593. 
Patell, J.M. (1976). “Corporate Forecasts of Earnings Per Share and Stock Price 
Behavior: Empirical Tests”. Journal of Accounting Research 14, 246-276. 
Ross, S., (1977), ‘The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive Signalling 
Approach’, Bell Journal of Economics 8, 23-40. 
Solé, J. (2008). “Prospects and challenges for developing corporate sukuk and bond 
markets”.  International Journal of Middle Eastern Finance and Management, 
1(1), 20-30. 
Spiess, D. and Affleck-Graves, J., 1999. The Long-Run Performance of Stock Returns 
following Debt Offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 54(1), 45-73. 
Tariq,  A.A, Dar, H. (2007) “Risks of Sukuk  structures: Implications for resource 
mobilization”. Thunderbird International Business Review, 49(2), 201-223. 
Usmani, M.T (2002). An Introduction to Islamic Finance. The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International. - 31 - 
 
Usmani, M.T (2007). “Sukuk and their contemporary applications”. Translated from 
the original Arabic by Sheikh Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo, AAOIFI Shari’a Council 
meeting, Saudi Arabia. 
Visser, H. (2009). Islamic Finance: Principles and Practice. Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham. 
Wilson, R. (2004). “Overview of the Sukuk Market”, in Islamic Bonds: Your Guide 
to Issuing, Structuring and Investing in Sukuk, Euromoney Books. 
Wilson, R. (2008). “Innovation in structuring of sukuk  securities”,  Humanomics, 
24(3), 170-181. 
 - 32 - 
 
Table 1 
Total Sukuk issuance 2000-2007 
 
The table below provides the value of Sukuk issuance in million USD for each year for the period 2000-2007. 
Source: adapted from data provided by the Islamic Finance Information Services (IFIS). 
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Corporate Sukuk  336.30  530.00  179.90  4,537.06  5,731.19  11,358.89  24,832.50  31,916.70 
% of total  100.00  67.95  18.36  79.36  79.48  94.14  90.65  82.69 
Sovereign Sukuk  0.00  250.00  800.00  1,180.00  1,479.35  706.50  2,560.00  6,679.90 
% of total  0.00  32.05  81.64  20.64  20.52  5.86  9.35  17.31 
Total Sukuk issuance  336.30  780.00  979.90  5,717.06  7,210.54  12,065.39  27,392.50  38,596.60 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics by type of security 
 
The table below provides the mean and standard deviation for several characteristics of the issues by 
type of bonds. All variables are in million Malaysian Ringgit, with the exception of coupon and issue 
price (in percent), maturity (in years), and number of past issues. Amount issued is the original issue 
amount for a security. Amount outstanding is the current amount of the issue outstanding. Coupon is 
the current interest rate of the security. Issue price is the price of the security at issue.  
 
Variable  N  Mean  Standard deviation 
Conventional bonds 
Amount issued  93  314.15  1,034.87 
Amount outstanding  93  208.37  304.87 
Coupon  93  3.79  3.13 
Issue price  51  99.17  4.14 
Maturity  82  6.51  11.69 
Sukuk 
Amount issued  77  96.00  160.73 
Amount outstanding  77  84.42  151.88 
Coupon  76  4.06  3.37 
Issue price  21  97.94  7.56 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics by issuer 
 
The table below provides the mean and standard deviation for several characteristics of the issuers by 
type of bonds. All variables are in million Malaysian Ringgit, with the exception of financial ratios and 
the number of past issues. Financial leverage is the ratio of average total assets to the average total 
common equity. Global amount outstanding is the debt distribution among outstanding for the current 
issuer only (excluding subsidiaries). Number of past issues is the number of securities used in the 
calculation of debt distribution values for the issuer. 
 
Variable  N  Mean  Standard deviation 
Conventional bonds 
Total assets  47  4 719.99  10 772.23 
Total market value  47  4 558.93  12 121.02 
Sales  47  1 122.33  3 015.00 
Equity to total assets  47  40.60  20.41 
Total debt to total assets  47  32.16  15.39 
Long term debt to total assets  47  20.34  11.24 
Ebit to total interest expenses  43  3.60  5.63 
Current ratio  44  2.13  1.60 
Operating margin  47  13.60  17.36 
Return on assets  46  1.73  6.45 
Global amount outstanding  47  653.36  1,287.50 
Number of past issues  47  3.10  3.68 
Sukuk 
Total assets  30  3 057.78  5 437.40 
Total market value  29  2 944.87  5 507.26 
Sales  30  2 028.13  4 169.64 
Equity to total assets  30  19.70  119.42 
Total debt to total assets  30  52.62  96.67 
Long term debt to total assets  30  29.84  35.92 
Ebit to total interest expenses  29  3.27  5.87 
Current ratio  29  1.90  1.43 
Operating margin  30  -4.32  86.39 
Return on assets  28  -3.10  33.25 
Global amount outstanding  30  610.66  1,487.26 
Number of past issues  30  6.63  6.96 
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Table 4 
Cumulative average abnormal returns 
 
This table displays CAARs and standardized CAARs by type of event (Sukuk vs. conventional bond 
announcement) in the third and fourth columns, and across three event windows. The percentage of 
positive CAARs is in the fifth column, while the last two columns provide p-values for t-tests of 
CAARs and Std. CAARs significance. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
Event window  Type of 
announcement 






Prob. > |t| 
for Std. 
CAAR 
[0,0]  Conventional 
bonds 
0.01426  0.34058  0.41860  0.46865  0.46057 
Sukuk  -0.00388  -0.09743  0.43421  0.28957  0.39266 
[-1,1]  Conventional 
bonds 
0.01828  0.12773  0.44086  0.26698  0.57526 
Sukuk  -0.00858  -0.19963  0.42857  0.18531  0.15673 
[-2,2]  Conventional 
bonds 
0.01904  0.14915  0.47312  0.29123  0.46663 
Sukuk  -0.01552**  -0.28522***  0.36364  0.01303  0.00812 
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Table 5 
Difference significance tests by type of events 
for cumulative average abnormal returns 
 
This table displays the results of Student, Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis tests for the difference of 
CAARs and standardized CAARs by type of investment security event (Sukuk vs. conventional bonds) 
across each of three event windows. For the first two tests, the null hypothesis is that the difference of 
CAARs (and  standardized CAARs) between Sukuk  and conventional bond events is zero. For the 
Kruskal-Wallis test, the null hypothesis is that the Sukuk and bond events samples come from identical 
populations. CAAR and standardized CAAR variances are unequal for the [0,0] event window 
according to Fisher tests, hence we use the Satterthwaite method for the Student tests. We find equal 
variances  for the other event  windows  and  we use the pooled method for the tests. The  Student 
approximation gives similar results to the normal approximation for Wilcoxon tests. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively. 
 
    Student test  Wilcoxon test  Kruskal-Wallis test 
Event window    t  Prob. > |t|  Z  Prob. > |Z|  Chi²  Prob. > Chi² 
[0,0] 
CAAR  0.91  0.3650  -0.1091  0.4566  0.0123  0.9118 
Std. CAAR  0.93  0.3570  0.0990  0.4606  0.0101  0.9198 
[-1,1] 
CAAR  1.53  0.1293  -0.4696  0.3193  0.2220  0.6375 
Std. CAAR  1.23  0.2214  -0.1033  0.4589  0.0110  0.9165 
[-2,2] 
CAAR  1.82*  0.0708  -1.1489  0.1253  1.3235  0.2500 
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Table 6 
Cumulative average abnormal returns – robustness checks  
using asymmetric event windows 
 
This table displays CAARs and standardized CAARs by type of event (Sukuk vs. conventional bond 
announcement) in the third and fourth columns, and across three event windows.. The percentage of 
positive CAARs is in the fifth column, while the last two columns provide p-values for t-tests of 
CAARs significance and Std. CAARs. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
Event window  Type of 
announcement 
CAAR  Std. CAAR  Positive 
CAAR (%) 
Prob. > |t| 
for CAAR 
Prob. > |t| 
for std. 
CAAR 
[-1,2]  Conventional 
bond 
0.01740  0.09836  0.46237  0.31130  0.63475 
Sukuk  -0.01319*  -0.25224*  0.38961  0.05976  0.05545 
[-2,1]  Conventional 
bond 
0.01991  0.17901  0.44086  0.22326  0.38247 
Sukuk  -0.01090*  -0.23953**  0.40260  0.05445  0.03319 
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Table 7 
Difference significance tests by type of events 
for cumulative average abnormal returns – robustness checks  
using asymmetric event windows 
 
This table displays the results of Student, Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis tests for the difference of 
CAARs and standardized CAARs by investment security event (Sukuk vs. conventional bonds) across 
each three event windows. For the first two tests, the null hypothesis is that the difference of CAARs 
(and standardized CAARs) between Sukuk and conventional bond events is zero. For the Kruskal-
Wallis test, the null hypothesis is that the Sukuk  and bond events samples come from identical 
populations. CAAR and standardized CAAR variances are unequal for the [0,0] event window 
according to Fisher tests, hence we use the Satterthwaite method for the Student tests. We find equal 
variances for the other event  windows  and  we use the pooled method for the tests. The  Student 
approximation gives similar results to the normal approximation for Wilcoxon tests. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively. 
 
      Student test  Wilcoxon test  Kruskal-Wallis 
test 
Event window     t  Prob. > |t|  Z   Prob. 
> |Z| 
Chi²  Prob. > 
Chi² 
[-1,2]  CAAR  1.66*  0.0966  -0.767  0.2216  0.5906  0.4422 
Std. CAAR  1.44  0.1524  -0.5009  0.3082  0.2524  0.6154 
[-2,1]  CAAR  1.79*  0.0754  -1.2804  0.1002  1.6433  0.2022 
Std. CAAR  1.80*  0.0733  -1.4838*  0.0689  2.2064  0.1374 
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Table 8 
Cumulative average abnormal returns – robustness checks 
using different market models 
 
This table displays CAARs and standardized CAARs by type of event (Sukuk vs. conventional bond 
announcement) in the third and fourth columns, and across three event windows. The percentage of 
positive CAARs is in the fifth column, while the last two columns provide p-values for t-tests of 
CAARs and Std. CAARs significance. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, 
respectively. 
Event window  Type of 
announcement 








Prob. > |t| 
for Std. 
CAAR 
[0,0]  Conventional 
bonds 
0.01426  0.34058  0.38710  0.46865  0.46057 
Sukuk  -0.00420  -0.11036  0.45455  0.25460  0.33673 
[-1,1]  Conventional 
bonds 
0.01828  0.12773  0.44086  0.26698  0.57526 
Sukuk  -0.00828  -0.19885  0.46753  0.20898  0.16729 
[-2,2]  Conventional 
bonds 
0.01903  0.14915  0.47312  0.29123  0.46663 






































 - 40 - 
 
Table 9 
Difference significance tests by type of events 
for cumulative average abnormal returns – robustness checks  
using different market models 
 
This table displays the results of Student, Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis tests for the difference of 
CAARs and standardized CAARs by investment security event (Sukuk vs. conventional bonds) across 
each three event windows. For the first two tests, the null hypothesis is that the difference of CAARs 
(and standardized CAARs) between Sukuk and conventional bond events is zero. For the Kruskal-
Wallis test, the null hypothesis is that the Sukuk  and bond events samples come from identical 
populations. CAAR and standardized CAAR variances are unequal for the [0,0] event window 
according to Fisher tests, hence we use the Satterthwaite method for the Student tests. We find equal 
variances for the other event  windows  and  we use the pooled method for the tests. The  Student 
approximation gives similar results to the normal approximation for Wilcoxon tests. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively. 
    Student test  Wilcoxon test  Kruskal-Wallis test 
Event window    t  Prob. > |t|  Z  Prob. > |Z|  Chi²  Prob. > Chi² 
[0,0]  CAAR  1.27  0.2071  0.2007  0.4205  0.0409  0.8397 
Std. CAAR  1.11  0.2689  -0.1817  0.4279  0.0336  0.8546 
[-1,1]  CAAR  1.43  0.1550  -0.1534  0.4390  0.0240  0.8769 
Std. CAAR  1.40  0.1641  -0.2536  0.3999  0.0651  0.7986 
[-2,2]  CAAR  1.77*  0.0796  -1.0143  0.1552  1.0319  0.3097 
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Figure 1 
Total amount of issues per year from 2002 to 2009 on the Malaysian market 
 
This figure is based on data from the Bloomberg database. The breakdown distinguishes among Sukuk 
and conventional bonds. 
 
 
 - 42 - 
 
Figure 2 
Total amount issued per year from 2002 to 2009 on the Malaysian market 
 
This figure is based on data from the Bloomberg database. The breakdown distinguishes among Sukuk 
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